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Concern about the participation of the sub-state level of governance in European
policy processes is not new. The European Commission's White Paper on European
Governance introduced innovative proposals to address this issue, which have stirred
up debate among the different actors involved. In this paper we analyse the progress
made so far in developing two of those proposals: the so-called "permanent
dialogue" between the Commission and Associations of regional and local authorities,
and the tripartite agreements between the Commission, a territorial entity and the
respective Member State. These ideas have not advanced and face several major
problems (political, legal and technical) which will be difficult to resolve. This article
analyses those problems, with the aim of contributing to the ongoing review process
of these proposals.
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Introduction
Debate over the participation of regions and local entities
in EU policy processes has been growing since the 1980s.
The basic issue is the following. In several countries the
regional level of government has legislative competence to
deal with matters which are shaped by decisions taken at
European level, often without their direct involvement.
Moreover, even though the practical responsibility for
implementation may lie with the regions, it is the Member
State, which is legally responsible for compliance under
European law. This can pose challenges for national
political systems. It may also have implications for the
effectiveness of implementation.
Traditionally, this has been considered an internal question
of the Member States. It has been up to them to establish
a system of territorial participation in the formation of the
position, which will be defended in the Council. Some
Member States have managed to build a quite satisfactory
system of representation of the regional interest in Brussels
(for example Germany), while in others, central governments
have until recently lacked the political will to satisfy regional
aspirations (for example Spain and the UK).
Treaty reforms have brought some new possibilities of
participation. The Maastricht Treaty recognised that Ministers
who participate in the Council might be from the regional
level, so long as they are authorised to speak for the
Member State as a whole. It also created the Committee of
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the Regions as an "advisory body". The major driving force
was to channel 'common interests' among the sub-state
levels of government. Yet interests have proven to be not so
common, while the enormous number of other paths of
access to Brussels that have developed have partially
emptied its consultative functions. The non-binding nature
of its opinions and the fact that many antagonistic types of
interests boil in the same pot has made direct lobbying
much more effective. The strongest regions in Europe were
rapidly disappointed, seeing their "baby" working in favour
of the "coffee for all" way of doing things. This consultative
body has thus faced a lack of interest on the part of some
of the strongest regional
representatives, and has
had to make efforts to try
to keep its privileged po-
sition as official interme-
diary with the European
institutions.
Informal ways of lob-
bying in Brussels by sub-
state authorities have
therefore been constantly
growing. In particular,
those sub-state actors who
are unhappy with their do-
mestic system for partici-
pation in European affairs
have been active in seeking direct influence in the
preparation, adoption and implementation of European
decisions. At the same time, concern about non-compliance
with EU rules has turned the attention of the EU institutions
to the sub-state level, since it is there that problems in
compliance with European law are often to be found, given
that a great part of these rules are to be implemented
completely at a sub-central level of governance.
In this context, a number of innovative proposals have
been made to find new ways of involving sub-state actors.
Notably, the European Commission in its "White Paper on
European Governance" of July 2001 proposed the
establishment of a "systematic dialogue" between the
European institutions and sub-state actors, as well as the
possible signature of  "contracts" with those actors as more
flexible means for implementation of EU rules. The White
Paper was a response to concerns about both the
effectiveness and legitimacy of European decision-making.
In this perspective, the Commission proposed to restructure
its contacts with the sub-state level, in order to achieve both
better law making and proper law implementation. If
regions and local entities were confronted with the obligation
of complying with laws for which their participation had not
been properly assured, the Commission would seek new
means to improve this situation, both in the process of
elaborating proposals ("bottom-up") and of implementation
("top-down"). This would mean two things: on the one
hand, to involve the regions in a structured dialogue at an
early stage of policy making; on the other hand, to offer
regions flexible means of compliance with the laws, by
signing contracts between the Commission, a region/local
entity and the State.1
This article assesses these proposals. It first looks back
to the origin of the proposals, highlighting the different
interests involved on the part of the European Commission,
the Committee of the Regions, associations of regional
entities and the main sub-state actors. It then reviews the
first steps, which have been taken as of 2005, and asks to
what extent these proposals are viable and sufficient to
address the continuing concerns.
The proposal for "permanent dialogue"
The Commission has always aimed to have an inclusive
approach by which every individual, enterprise or association
can provide the Commission with input.2  Yet the fact that
the enlarged Union would include 250 regions and 100,000
local authorities3  made it necessary to look for ways to
structure the dialogue, and to reduce the number of parties
involved. It thus proposed
a systematic dialogue with
national and European
associations of regional
and local governments.
In principle, this idea see-
med to match regional
and local claims.4  Various
associations thought that
"the motivation behind the
intended dialogue is
good" and could help pro-
vide a new consultative
mechanism, addressed
specifically towards sub-
state government.5 The
problems arose when describing how this systematic
dialogue should actually function.
According to the Commission's proposal, the dialogue
would take place at an early stage of the policy formulation,
and would be between the Commission and the associations
that are invited on a case-by-case basis. No mention was
made to direct dialogue with individual regions. The criteria
for selection of such associations6  included the need for
them to be representative bodies that are able to deliver a
jointly agreed opinion from their members, and to pass on
to those members Commission proposals and policy
guidelines. Furthermore, the associations which should
participate in the dialogue should be those concerned by
and with a direct interest in the policy in question.
The question of how the selection of the associations to
participate would be made was also controversial:  A fair
balance among associations representing different
categories of regional and local authorities was to be kept;
and the number of associations selected should remain
manageable in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the
dialogue. The list of associations to be invited, and the
agenda for the meeting, would be decided by the
Commission on the basis of a proposal from the Committee
of the Regions. The stated  purpose of the dialogue was
both to give the parties an opportunity to express their views
and help to strengthen the ties between the Committee and
the Associations. It was not clear, however, whether the
Commission's aims coincided with those pursued by the
sub-state level, in particular by the regions with legislative
powers.
The differing aims of the Commission
and sub-state actors
Historically there has been a difference in perception
between the European Commission and the sub-state level
of governance regarding the objectives to be achieved
The Commission proposed
to restructure its contacts
with the sub-state level,
in order to achieve
both better law making
and proper law
implementation.
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through the increased participation of the regions and local
entities in European affairs.
The Commission has been seeking, through the
involvement of the level closest to the citizens, to achieve
both better law-making and proper law implementation,
as part of its response to growing concerns about the
efficiency and legitimacy of EU laws. Moreover, the need of
the Commission to decentralise some tasks of the Union
has been growing as its competences have increased. This
has become more evident in view of enlargement.
The sub-state level and in particular the regions with
legislative powers, on the other hand, have been looking
for new opportunities for greater and more direct
participation, as well as increased influence in European
affairs generally, in order to reinforce their own competences
and identity. The Commission has thus traditionally been
an important ally for the European regional and local
authorities, inasmuch as the alliance has contributed to
fulfil its objectives.  But whenever the claims of the sub-state
level have been perceived by the Commission, or by some
of its services, as having further political consequences,
they have been reluctant to risk any sort of negative reaction
from the Member States, which are always very cautious
about the demands of the regions for more participation in
Europe.
The result of the consultation
When preparing the White Paper, the Secretariat General
of the Commission opened a period of public consultations.
The regional and local actors and their associations were
those who responded massively7  but with different degrees
of success: the associations managed to be the interlocutors
in the proposed dialogue while the regions individually
were denied that possibility.8 As a result of the strong
lobbying carried out by the associations, as well as the fact
that the European Com-
mission could not by this
means formalise its exis-
ting informal contacts with
sub-state authorities, the
regions as such were not
made a direct part of this
structured dialogue. Once
again the interest of the
Commission to preserve
the institutional architec-
ture clashed with the ob-
jectives pursued by some European regions.
The Commission argues that for the selection of the
parties, it is obliged to follow the principle of respect of the
constitutional orders of the Member States.9  On that basis,
it affirmed that the Committee of the Regions "is the body
best placed to identify the associations concerned by the
different policies and to suggest the list of associations on
a case by case basis" and explained why the parties to the
dialogue "can only be" the national and European
associations of local and regional government.10
The reactions of the Associations
The Commission presented its ideas in a working paper,
and encouraged all parties, in particular the associations,
to react to its ideas before May 2003.11  All associations
welcomed the initiative, although many had reservations
concerning how the permanent dialogue would be
conducted. The majority did not agree that the Committee
of the Regions should draw up the list of participants and
therefore the Commission reconsidered the role given to
the Committee.12  The Committee was moved from being
considered "the best placed to identify what associations
have an interest in which policies",13  to "the best placed to
help to identify" such associations. Moreover, the Committee
would not suggest lists of associations for each policy area
on a case by case basis, but an indicative list of European
and national associations. The Commission maintained
the right to invite whichever associations it sees fit to the
various dialogue meetings. As a result, the dialogue pro-
cedure was defined as follows:
• The responsibility of organising and holding meetings
rests with the Commission.
• There will be a fixed annual meeting between the
President of the Commission and the representatives of
the associations. This does not replace the annual
meeting with the Committee of the Regions for the
presentation of the Commission's annual work
programme.
• There will also be meetings with the Commissioners
responsible for policies that have an impact at territorial
level.
• The agenda will be determined by the Commission's
general work programme.
• The list of associations to be invited will be decided by
the Commission for each meeting on the basis of
proposals made by the Committee of the Regions.
The pilot meeting
The first permanent dialogue meeting was held in May
2004. Romano Prodi chaired it with the participation of
Commission representatives, the President of the Committee
of the Regions, and repre-
sentatives from most Euro-
pean and national asso-
ciations of regional and
local authorities. The im-
pressions expressed by
different representatives
present are quite negative.
While the Committee of
the Regions saw it as a
positive first attempt from
which some lessons can
be learned, some of the representatives thought there was
insufficient time and missed a clear agenda setting the
objectives of the meeting. For future meetings the scope of
the topics to be dealt with should be previously agreed with
the associations themselves, since the first experience has
been for some of the participants "an empty useless
show".14
The consequences of the permanent
dialogue proposal for the associations
The expected added value of this new instrument for the
sub-state level was to initiate a real dialogue with the
Commission. And for the regions with legislative powers
("Regleg"), a further added value would have been to be
allowed to hold the structure dialogue directly, and not via
the Associations. Neither expectation has been fulfilled.
The expected added value
of this new instrument for
the sub-state level was to
initiate a real dialogue
with the Commission.
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Some regions with legislative powers now do not see this
structured dialogue as a solution to the lack of direct
participation in the pre-legislative phase, all the more so
since this dialogue will only be held a couple of times per
year and the meetings will be of a very short duration.
Another important outcome of the proposed dialogue
could be the changing dynamics of the membership of
these associations. The specialisation level of these asso-
ciations has been growing, and with this growth, more and
more regions have started to be selective in choosing the
association to which they wanted to belong. Political dialogue
will also mobilise and create a lot of associations among
the regions and local enti-
ties of the new members
of the European Union.
The Commission will then
have succeeded in mobi-
lising a high number of
sub-state actors.15 The risk
exists that the mobilisation
effect could be reduced to
the big rich territorial units,
more than to the smaller,
less powerful ones.16  In
fact, some associations
cover different overlap-
ping areas of interest, and
we already see that some
regions belong to many different organisations.17 But
membership to the associations is costly.18  This means that
the "belonging to all" way of working will be expensive and
most likely we will see a grouping by areas of interest.19
In any case, the challenges arising from the permanent
dialogue proposal are many, and not easy to be dealt with.
Dialogue has been by definition a non systematic, non
procedural way of having direct contact with the Commission
by those who – in principle – are not legitimised to have it.
Systematisation may have its pros and cons. Of course a
systematic dialogue, if well organised, can provide openness
and transparency regarding the preparation of legislative
proposals of specific interest for the territories in Europe.
But too much systematisation could turn the dialogue into
a conflict between the associations or between them and
the Committee of the Regions.
The consequences of these initiatives will be seen in the
long run. If well developed, the permanent dialogue could
signify the official introduction of the associations of the
sub-State level in the pre-legislative decision making process.
The creation of new sub-state nets of influence would be a
consequence of this move. The Committee of the Regions
would have a new role and the central position of the
Commission would be reinforced.  But for the ones claiming
direct participation in the pre-legislative phase, the initiative
will not fulfil its demands.
Tripartite agreements and contracts
The permanent dialogue was supposed to involve the
territorial units at the earliest possible stage of the cycle
(bottom-up), in order to help draft rules that would be in
harmony with individual local peculiarities. In order to help
decentralise and adapt implementation to territorial
peculiarities (top-down), the White Paper also launched the
idea of target-based tripartite contracts between the
Commission, the Member State and regional/local
authorities for implementation of Community rules. The
driving force behind this proposal is that tripartite agreements
and contracts can both boost effectiveness, as a result of
greater flexibility, and increase legitimacy, through greater
participation of regional and local authorities in the
implementation of EU policies with a strong territorial
impact.
This move derived in part from a sense of frustration in
the Commission services responsible for monitoring the
application of Community Law. In fact in federal (or
strongly decentralised) States many competences lie at the
regional or local level. In these cases, the State, when
transposing Community
law, makes a "framework
general national law" that
then goes through a "se-
cond" transposition phase
at sub-state level. The re-
sponsibility for appropri-
ate implementation of the
law rests with the Member
State, but in practice it is
the regional/local level
that is de facto (but not de
iure) responsible for a cor-
rect or wrong implemen-
tation.
According to the Com-
mission Communication on these tripartite instruments,20
Member States will keep the control of the development of
the objectives agreed within the contract or agreement
since they will have the final responsibility for compliance.
Preparatory meetings between the State and the regional or
local level should reveal the diverse situations in a specific
territorial space, and trigger fruitful co-operation among
the different levels of governance. As a result of these
dynamics, maintains the Commission Communication, the
regional and local level should be better involved in the
policy implementation and the implementation process
itself will become more open and transparent. In addition,
the region or local authority party to the contract would take
over more responsibility, and would become obliged to
report on the developments of the objectives agreed and to
comply with a specific timetable for obtaining the agreed
results. It is therefore foreseeable, the Communication
concludes, that better policies, regulation and delivery will
arise.
The first proposal: bilateral contracts
The initial proposal in fact contemplated "bilateral" contracts
between the Commission and the regional/local level.21
These would be new legally binding instruments for direct
cooperation with the decentralised territorial entities that
have the responsibilities for implementing EU policies in the
Member States. Once a contract was concluded, and for
the period of its validity, the provisions in the framework
Directive related to the implementation would be waived
and replaced by the contract. These contracts would be in
full respect of the Constitutional arrangements of the
Member State and if necessary the state could become a
partner. The idea was to develop tailor-made solutions
taking the partnership within Structural Funds programming
as a reference. But now the difference would be that, while
in partnership there are no binding obligations, with this
The initial proposal
contemplated "bilateral"
contracts between the
Commission and the
regional/local level.
These would be new
legally binding instruments.
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contractual tool there would be legal certainty.
The College of Commissioners, however, did not endorse
this proposal. The problems were both political and legal:
the bilateral contract would mean the exclusion of the
Member States, with the consequent loss of control.
Furthermore, it would lower the position of the Commission
vis-à-vis the sub-state entities, since in a contractual relation
parties are equal in the terms of the contract. The guardian
of the Treaties would become party and judge at the same
time. The College converted the bilateral contracts into
tripartite ones including the Member States. While for the
Commission the implication of the State was a must for its
interests, for the sub-state level, or more precisely, for the
RegLeg, the introduction of the State meant the privileged
placement of the State in relation to the Commission.
The final proposal:
tripartite agreements and contracts
The Commission published a Communication in December
2002 in which it described two sorts of contractual tools:
target-based tripartite contracts, in relation to the application
of binding law; and target-based tripartite agreements, in
relation to the application of soft law.22  It proposed to
develop these tools in two phases: an initial one with pilot
agreements, and only afterwards, following the results of
the agreements, sign tripartite contracts where appropriate.
The agreements and contracts have to be compatible
with the Treaties; they must respect the constitutional
systems of the States, and can not constitute a barrier to the
sound operation of the single market. They have to be
justified by providing some type of added value: simpler
implementation, political benefits, efficiency gains resulting
from the close involvement of regional and local authorities,
or speedier performance.
The Commission described the general characteristics
of target-based tripartite contracts and agreements,
including the scope, duration, identification of actors, and
the description of the ob-
jectives, as well as the obli-
gation of information and
advertising preceded by
a period of consultation
involving organisations
representing local and
regional life.
According to the final
proposal an enabling
clause could be included
in Regulations, Directives
or Decisions, to empower
the Commission to imple-
ment the law via tripartite contracts.
Each tripartite contract must contain a provision referring
to the exclusive responsibility of the Member State vis-à-vis
the Commission for the correct execution of the contract. In
this way the established architecture of the European legal
system is assured: the EU institutions cannot contemplate
infringement procedures at other levels than that of the
Member States. The effects of non-compliance need to be
included as well: in the case of a tripartite contract foreseen
in a Regulation, Directive or Decision, the basic act will
stipulate that, in case of non-execution of the contract, the
rules of Community Law will immediately be applied. In the
case of non-execution of an agreement, the consequences
will have to be analysed on a case-by-case basis.
The fact that no funding was planned to support these
contracts has made the realisation of the proposal even
more difficult. Although the Commission will provide some
start up funding in the trial stage, in general these agreements
or contracts will not qualify for additional Community
funding.
The reactions of the parties
The reservations of some Member States were made clear
even though the White Paper on European Governance
stressed the fact that the right of selection of the parties to
the contract or agreement would be in their hands and that
any contract would only be agreed upon while respecting
national and constitutional arrangements.
The European Parliament reacted in December 200323
in the so-called McCormick Report. The Parliament agrees
that the Commission should go ahead with pilot agreements,
but the cases involved should be of sufficient number to
serve as a test for this method and assess whether it
achieves flexibility in implementing legislation. Monitoring
and a flow of information were also requested. The Report
stressed the fact that these instruments should only be used
for exceptional cases and under very specific conditions.
The final political responsibility must remain very clear for
the citizens and should lie with the Member States. The
report also pointed to the fact that the Communication only
vaguely mentioned the possibility of specific financial
provisions for the tripartite agreements and contracts,
making clear that they would not be a means for extra
community funding. However this has proven to be one of
the main paralysing factors in the evolution of the pilot
experiments.
The Committee of the Regions welcomed from the
beginning the idea of tripartite contracts,24  and has been
following the proposal very closely.25
The Commission itself has suffered from the beginning
from a lack of universal
enthusiasm in the deve-
lopment of tripartite
agreements. While offi-
cials in the Secretariat
General are pushing for
this experiment, other
DGs seem to be rather
sceptical.
As for reactions from
the regional and local
level, opinions differ. The
Presidency of the Basque
Parliament, for example,
stated that tripartite contracts are one of the practical ideas
that will most contribute towards European integration.26
There may also be criticism, however, from some regions
that see these ideas as interference by the State. Especially
those regions with legislative competence in the area of
environment showed disagreement with the proposals: if
the competence is in the hands of the region, the presence
of the state is not justified.27  The only justification which this
sceptical group of regions could see, in order to try to
understand why the Commission was launching this proposal
of tripartite agreements, would be the "offer" to delay
compliance with the law under the appearance of acting
according to the agreed terms of contract. These regions
The fact that no funding
was planned to support
these contracts has
made the realisation
of the proposal
even more difficult.
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have been wondering if flexibility would mean giving more
time to a certain territory to comply with the law, or if would
mean the postponement of initiating legal actions against
the signatories of an agreement, complying late with the
rules.28
As of July 2005, the Council had not given explicit
support to the continuation of this initiative. The Netherlands,
during its Presidency, organised a high-level meeting
creating an informal European network on governance, in
which EU Member States can exchange expertise and
experiences. Among the themes that were discussed was
the reduction of unnecessary administrative burdens of EU
legislation on local and regional authorities, including the
analysis of the new instrument on tripartite contracts. The
British Presidency will most likely hold a second high-level
meeting in London in November 2005. One of the points
of the agenda will very likely be the technicalities of tripartite
agreements.
In the plenary meeting of the Assembly of European
regions of 10 April 2003, the Commission presented its
proposals for the implementation of tripartite contracts. It
encouraged the regions to address the Commission directly,
explaining that there were no conditions to be satisfied in
order for a project tripartite contract to be launched.29 Two
years later, only one agreement has been signed. The
reasons for this being – among others – that the proposal
has shortcomings in the eyes of some regions, both in the
lack of financial support for this initiative, and in the
impossibility to have bilateral contracts.
The first tripartite agreement
The purpose of the pilot experiments is to test the feasibility
and usefulness of the tripartite arrangements. The Com-
mission will then consider the possibility of launching target
based tripartite contracts among the Member States, the
regional and local authorities and the Commission itself in
order to give direct binding application to secondary
legislation.30
In the consultation process preceding the White Paper,
the Commission had become aware of the need to take
greater account of the local effect of Community policies in
areas such as transport, energy, or the environment. It
therefore aimed at signing three tripartite agreements with
European cities: one pro-
ject in Birmingham (UK)
concerning urban mobi-
lity, one in Lille (France)
relating to the manage-
ment of new urban zones
and one in Pescara (Italy)
on urban mobility and air
quality. Eurocities also
proposed a series of tri-
partite agreements in a
pilot phase in relation to
the 6th Environment action programme, in the areas of
sustainable public transportation and integrated
management systems for the urban environment.
Later on, a fourth project was presented by the region
of Lombardy (Italy) on sustainable urban planning and
transport policy. This is the only project signed to date. It
was signed on 15 October 2004 in Milan between the
European Commission, the Italian State and the region of
Lombardy. The aim of the agreement is to improve the
implementation of policies adopted in the area of
environment, transport and energy sectors. As of July 2005
the preparation phase has been completed by the regions,
and the participation of the State is ready. The search for
financial support for the initiative from the Commission is
being discussed with the Commission services. In case of a
negative from the Commission services to give economic
support, the whole process could be paralysed.
Conclusions
The recognition by the Commission of the importance of
the regions and local entities in the European integration
process, and its stated desire to involve those actors at an
early stage of the policy making is a remarkable step
forward for the sub-state levels of governance. The fact that
the Commission is looking for ways to involve the regions
earlier, and to make the implementation of EU law more
flexible, considering the territorial peculiarities of the areas
where those laws have to be applied, has created strong
expectations among some levels of governance.
It may be considered doubtful that the Commission has
found the right mechanisms to achieve its aims. The
structured dialogue will be with associations, leaving strong
economic regions with legislative powers without the
possibility of an official direct and structured dialogue with
Brussels. The possibility opened by the Commission of
direct contact through associations will not prevent those
regions from going ahead with direct lobbying, which has
proved to be expensive but fruitful. The result could be that
direct lobbying will be preferred and that calls for a
structured dialogue with the associations lack real political
relevance.
On the other hand, the tripartite agreements still remain
a mystery. The final outcome of the idea of tripartite
contracts, as it stands today, is rather weak and its effec-
tiveness remains to be seen. For the time being, we can only
inform on some scepticism shown by several regions which
have exclusive competence in the areas selected for this
type of contracts. They see it as an intrusion of the State in
areas where it should not play a role. The innovative
proposal of the Commission Task Force for bilateral contracts
was very soon watered-down. From bilateral contracts the
proposal moved into the stage of tripartite agreements,
abandoning the binding
nature of the contracts and
the "direct" relation of the
Commission with the sub-
state level. Moreover, fur-
ther clarification is needed
as to how these agree-
ments and contracts may
operate. Will they create
exceptions for the signa-
tories regarding time for
compliance with the laws?
How will  legal questions such as hierarchy of legal acts,
comitology procedures and others be solved? It could be a
potentially valuable instrument, but requires further
concretisation to become really attractive in the eyes of
either regions or Member States.
To conclude, all parties affected have broadly welcomed
the White Paper proposals and their development. But for
them to be useful and efficient, further thinking is needed.
Would it be possible and convenient to invite individual
The final outcome of the
idea of tripartite contracts
as it stands today, is rather
weak and its effectiveness
remains to be seen.
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regions – under certain circumstances – to the dialogue?
Would it be advisable to revise the objectives of the tripartite
agreements and contracts to make them clearer, and as a
consequence, more attractive? Would it be necessary to
include financial provisions for this type of contracts?  We
are involved in an ongoing learning process. Revisions of
these proposals are needed and we can certainly expect
further changes. ::
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